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Contrary to received wisdom, two recent studies report a negative relation-
ship between leverage and profitability in banking in the 1980s and early 
1990s. This study presents new data on the leverage and profitability of 
Swedish commercial banks in 1870–2001, and explore the sign of the relation-
ship in the long term. In the studied period, the capital-asset ratio decreased 
by a factor four, while return-on-equity more than doubled. The Leverage 
Formula postulates a positive linear relation between return-on-equity and 
the debt-equity ratio. A strong positive linear relationship was found over 
the period 1871–1980, but not in 1980–2001. Thus, while supporting the re-
sults of the previous studies, a long-term “normal” positive relationship be-
tween leverage and profitability is also reaffirmed.  
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In banking as in any industry, it is common knowledge that higher 
leverage normally means higher returns (but also greater risk). Yet, 
two recent studies actually find a negative relationship between lever-
age and returns in banking. Berger (1995) studies about 9,000 Ameri-
can banks in 1983–1989, and reports a statistically significant positive 
relationship between return-on-equity (ROE) and the capital-asset 
ratio (CAR, the inverse of leverage). Likewise, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) use bank-level data for 80 countries in the years 
1988–1995, and they also report a statistically significant positive rela-
tionship between capital and returns.  
  These results are indeed surprising. That leverage increases re-
turns seems to follow directly from the very nature of business. In its 
strongest form, the Leverage Formula predicts that return-on-equity 
should increase linearly with the debt-equity ratio (DER). How can 
this be reconciled with the empirical results? One possibility is that 
the negative correlation between leverage and profitability is a short-
run phenomenon. The results could reflect special circumstances of 
the 1980s and early 1990s. The 1980s was a decade of financial liber-
alisation, and the early 1990s was a time of financial turmoil. In one 
decade there is small variation in banks’ leverage. The difference in 
leverage among banks, at least in Europe and in North America, is 
small. Conceivably, successful banks could tend to be both more capi-
talised and more profitable in the short run, which could obscure the 
fundamental positive correlation between leverage and returns.   
    It would therefore be interesting to see whether the reported 
relationship holds also in the long term. The long-term variation in 
bank leverage is large – capital-asset ratios  were 15–20 percent at the 
turn of the 19th century, while they are about 5 percent today. Has 
this development had any influence on bank returns?  
This paper uses industry-level data for Sweden in the years 1870–
2001 to study this very question. The main result is that there is in-
deed a strong positive long-term relationship between leverage and 
profitability in banking. In accordance with the Leverage Formula, 
return-on-equity increased linearly with the debt-equity ratio over 
the period. However, the relationship was not present in the 1980s 
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positive relationship between leverage and profitability in banking, 
the results of the previous studies are supported.  
To my knowledge, there is as yet no study of the long-term (cen-
tury-long) relation between leverage and profitability in banking. 
With regard to leverage, Berger et al. (1995) present data on the CAR 
of the US banking system 1840–1990. Saunders and Wilson (1999) 
compare changes in the CAR of the banking systems in Canada, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 1893–1992. With regard to 
long-term profitability, Capie and Billings (2001a, 2001b) report re-
turns as well as capital-asset ratios for major English banks in 1920–
1968, but do not discuss their connection to each other.  
2  Measuring bank capital   
The data are taken from the Summary of the Bank Reports (Samman-
drag af bankernas uppgifter). Chartered banks were required to report 
monthly balance statements to the Bank Supervisory Authority 
(Bankinspektionen). I use aggregated income statements and end-of-
year balance statements, for the years 1870–2001. There are two prob-
lems that make it difficult to get accurate and comparable measures 
of bank capital for the whole period. First, the Summary Reports do 
not show hidden reserves, and reservations made to them, in the pe-
riod 1948–1968. Second, corporate tax rates varied, from zero in the 
19th century, to over 50 percent in the 1970s. How should profits and 
hidden reserves be “taxed” over the whole period? These two prob-
lems are discussed in this section.1  
2.1  Estimating hidden reserves 1948–1968 
Before 1968, Write-offs and Reservations (Avskrivningar och Avsättnin-
gar) were not separated in the reports. Before 1948, banks made res-
ervations to so called delcredere accounts, hidden within ordinary 
deposit accounts. In 1948, banks instead started to make reservations 
to so called Valuation Reserve Accounts, VRAs. Before 1968, these are 
                                                      
1 Interestingly, the same problems discussed here occurred in other countries 
over the same years. See Capie and Billings (2001a, 2001b)  for an analysis of 
true profits and capital of the six major British banks in 1920–1968.  
  2hidden within a large entry called Sundry Accounts. From 1968 they 
show up separately. From 1983 they are called Untaxed Reserves. The 
problem with these hidden reserves is a serious caveat. It becomes 
impossible to accurately calculate actual capital, as well as actual op-
erating profits, and therefore impossible to calculate both leverage 
and profitability accurately. Since these reserves at the end of the 
1960s were as large as reported equity, estimations of the CAR and 
ROE may be misleading. To get the actual values of reserves and res-
ervations, as opposed to reported ones, it would be necessary to con-
sult the internal accounts of each bank. To do this for the whole bank-
ing system is at worst impossible, and at best a Herculean effort be-
yond the time limits of this study. I will instead estimate reserves and 
reservations (and losses) for the years 1948–1968, as explained below.  
In Sweden, the only attempt at calculating hidden reserves is Ols-
son (1986, p. 216). Using internal accounts, he calculates hidden re-
serves for 1945–1969 for Stockholms Enskilda Bank, one of the largest 
Swedish commercial banks. He finds that hidden reserves were about 
as large as visible equity for the whole period. The case of Stockholms 
Enskilda Bank may be atypical, however. First, this bank was excep-
tional in that it was much more of an old-fashioned banker’s firm, 
rather than a modern joint stock bank (Lindgren 1987). It was con-
trolled by one family and bookkeeping could therefore be more in-
formal. Second, this bank experienced a severe crisis already in 1878–
1879, when it almost went bankrupt. One may therefore assume that 
it started to make precautionary reservations to hidden accounts 
more promptly than other banks.  
For these other banks with a more dispersed set of owners, in 
particular the joint stock banks, hidden reserves possibly did not play 
a large role until the crises of 1922 and 1932. Hidden reserves were 
also probably depleted during these crises. Reservations to delcredere 
accounts may have increased in the immediate aftermath of the cri-
ses, but were partly dissolved after some years when the crisis was 
thought to be over. The Summary Reports in the 1930s contain entries 
for “income from previously written-off claims” that indicate this. 
Reservations to delcredere accounts were probably more sporadic 
and less systematic than those made later to the VRAs.  
  3Because hidden reserves prior to 1948 cannot be estimated, I (im-
plausibly) assume that they were zero. The VRAs were then zero in 
1947. Since they are reported in the Summary Reports from 1968, ag-
gregate credit losses (depreciation on financial assets) for 1948–1968 
may then be calculated by the formula  
Credit Losses 1948–68  = Write-offs 1948–68 – VRAs 1968.       (1) 
The Summary Reports contain specific entries for the write-offs of 
claims, bonds and stocks. VRAs exist for bonds, claims and curren-
cies. Two complications make the use of formula (1) less straightfor-
ward. First, write-offs and VRAs do not match – how should write-
offs on stocks be matched with VRAs for currencies? Second, there is 
the question of how to measure reserves in bonds. In the Summary 
Reports from 1968 and onwards, total reserves are calculated as 
VRAs for claims and currencies, plus the excess value of the bond portfo-
lio. This entity is calculated as market value – (nominal value – VRA for 
bonds). The bond portfolio is in its turn reported “net” in the assets 
column of the balance statement, that is, in nominal value minus 
VRA for bonds.  
This method has two shortcomings. First, it includes into the 
books  potential but non-realised losses on bond sales. This would 
seem to distort the measure of operating profits. Second, reserves and 
thus book capital become sensitive to the market fluctuations of the 
bond portfolio. Since the market value of the bond portfolio is sensi-
tive to the interest rate, book capital would become sensitive to the 
interest rate. This may create swings in ROE that may not reflect op-
erating profitability.  
I will therefore use the more straightforward method to treat the 
VRAs for bonds as hidden reserves. In the calculation of the CAR 
below, the gross measure of assets will consequently be used, that is, 
reported assets plus the VRA for bonds. Table 1 shows VRAs, write-
offs and estimated losses 1948–1968.  
  4Table 1  VRAs, write-offs and estimated losses 1948–1968 (million SEK).  
 Claims  Bonds  Stocks  Currencies  Aggregate 
VRAs 1968  1390  824  -  126  2341 
Write-offs 1948–68  1733  853  83  -  2669 
Losses 1948–68  474  29  83  –126  460 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Losses 1948–68 = Write-offs 1948–68 
minus VRAs 1968. VRA 1968 for claims include inflow 1948–1968 of previ-
ously written-off claims, 132 million SEK.  
Table 1 reveals that aggregate losses are approximately equal to the 
losses on claims. Losses on stocks and bonds could then approxi-
mately be set to zero. Write-offs on bonds and stocks may be treated 
as reservations made to the VRA for currencies. As a first approxima-
tion, then, aggregate losses are equal to the losses on claims.  
The problem then becomes how to assess the time pattern of 
these losses. This act must necessarily be more or less arbitrary. One 
possible pattern is given in Figure 1, where write-offs and estimated 
losses in 1933–1975 are shown: 



















Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Write-offs 1968–1975 = “acknowl-
edged losses” (konstaterade förluster).  
Losses have been calculated so that aggregate write-offs in 1948–1968 
minus aggregate losses in 1948–1968 will equal VRA for claims in 
  51968. I assume that losses were constant until the middle of the 1950s, 
and then they started to rise to the reported value of “acknowledged 
losses” in 1968.  
2.2  Tax rates on profits and reserves 
How should hidden reserves be treated from a fiscal point of view, 
that is, how much of them should be regarded as equity, and how 
much as unpaid taxes? That depends on the purpose of the study. If 
capital is seen as the fund by which to sustain losses, then hidden 
reserves should not be reduced by deferred taxes for the period 1948–
1982. In theory, the VRAs were “loan-loss provision accounts”. Credit 
losses would directly affect the VRA. The use of accumulated funds 
would be tax free in case of negative profits. Focus here is on the re-
turn on owners’ capital, rather than on capital strength, however. 
Profits were never negative in 1948–1982 – if the VRAs were resolved 
in case of positive profits, they would be taxed at the going tax rate 
(about 50 percent until 1990). For the purpose of this study, then, they 
should be taxed.  
The question then becomes at what rate. An option would be to 
tax according to the actual rate. However, I will "tax" profits and hid-
den reserves with a uniform tax rate of 30 percent for the whole pe-
riod 1870–2001. A uniform tax rate is chosen because operating prof-
itability, which is the concern here, can then be compared over time. 
30 percent is chosen because it is roughly the current Swedish corpo-
rate tax rate.2   
3  Leverage and profitability of the Swedish 
commercial banks, 1870–2001 
This section presents figures for the leverage and profitability of the 
Swedish commercial banks, 1870–2001. Figures for the capital-asset 
ratio, return-on-equity, and the (average) debt-equity ratio are pre-
sented.  Variables are defined as in Table 2.  
                                                      
2 At the time of writing (November 2004), it is 28 percent.  
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Variable   Definition 
Untaxed Reserves     1948–1982: VRAs 
1983– : reported values 
Capital   C  Equity + 70 percent of  
Untaxed Reserves 
Assets    A  Reported assets + VRA for bonds 
Profits   P  70 percent of operating profits  
(revenues – costs – credit losses) 
Capital-asset ratio   CARt C t  / At 
Return-on-equity    ROEt P t  / Ct-1 
Debt-equity ratio   DERt ((At + At-1) / 2) / Ct-1 – 1 
Note: VRAs and credit losses are estimated for 1948–1968. 
3.1  The capital-asset ratio  
Figure 2 shows the capital-asset ratio for the Swedish commercial 
banks in the period 1870–2001:  
















Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
In 1870–1895 the CAR decreased. This was a period when deposit 
banking rapidly expanded. Then an upward trend started that 
peaked in 1911. From 1895 to 1910, the number of banks grew from 45 
  7to 80. The upward trend in the CAR therefore probably reflects an 
inflow of equity into the banking sector. From 1911, the CAR started 
to drop. It declined rapidly during the First World War, reaching a 
minimum in the post-war recession in 1922. It then remained re-
markably stable during the new gold period 1924–1931. The CAR 
then sharply dropped in 1932 – the year of the Kreuger crash, when 
gold was abandoned and the Swedish crown was devalued. But after 
this one-time drop, the CAR again remained stable through the rest 
of the 1930s. Then a period of secular decline followed that started in 
1940. In this year, inflation took off, corporate taxes were raised, and 
exchange controls were imposed. The CAR dropped steadily between 
1940 and 1980. It has since then remained rather stable at about 6 per-
cent.  
One may compare Figure 2 with the figures of the CAR for the 
US, 
3.2 Return-on-equity 
ity of the Swedish commercial banks, 
UK and Canada presented by Berger et al. (1995) and Saunders 
and Wilson (1999). The CAR of the Swedish commercial banks con-
forms to the pattern in these countries of a secular downward trend, 
with a particularly sharp drop during the First World War. The up-
ward trend in 1895–1911 seems unique for Sweden, however. Also, 
the long secular drop in 1940–1980 appears to be special for Sweden – 
the CARs of the other countries seem to have stabilised after the Sec-
ond World War.  
Figure 3 depicts return-on-equ
1871–2001.  
  8Figure 3  Return-on-equity of the Swedish commercial banks, 1871–2001.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
The stability of the ROE during the classical gold standard – particu-
larly in 1890–1914 – is eye-catching. During the First World War there 
was a sharp rise in profitability, ending in a recession in 1922 when 
profits for the first time turned negative. Profitability was then fairly 
stable around pre-war levels during the new gold standard period in 
1924–1931. In the ill-fortuned year of 1932 profits turned negative for 
the second time. In this year, the Kreuger empire collapsed, and Swe-
den abandoned the gold standard. Beginning in 1942, ROE began to 
increase secularly. It nearly doubled in the Bretton Woods period, 
compared to the levels of the classical gold standard. After Bretton 
Woods from 1971, ROE rose sharply – it doubled again. This era 
ended in 1991, when the largest banking crisis ever hit the banks. For 
three years profits were negative, reaching the staggering numbers of 
31 and 25 percent in 1992-1993. This was a reflection of huge credit 
losses that materialised when the overheated economy of the 1980s 
was radically brought to a halt. Factors were: 1) a major change in the 
tax code, where interest subsidies were slashed from 80 to 30 percent, 
2) a change in the goal of monetary policy, from full employment to 
low inflation. Combined, these factors increased real interest rates 
from negative numbers to positive ones of 5–10 percent. An additio-
















  9tumn of 1992, during which the Bank of Sweden raised its margin 
rate to 500 percent. The banking sector rapidly recovered after the 
crown began to float, and already in 1994 profits were "normal" and 
positive. On the roots and consequences of the Swedish banking crisis 
see Englund (1999).  
Figure 3 show returns in “nominal” terms, that is, disregarding 
price inflation. Have returns risen also in “real” terms, when price 
inflation is taken into account? Indeed, this seems to be the case, as 
Table 3 reveals.  
Table 3  Average “real” and “nominal” return-on-equity for the Swedish 
commercial banks, 1871–2001.  
  1871–1915 1945–1970 1971–1990 1995–2001 
Price  inflation  1% 4% 8% 1% 
“Real” ROE  5%  7%  13%  13% 
“Nominal”  ROE  5% 11% 22% 14% 
 Sources: Summary of the Bank Reports, Statistics Sweden.  
Even in ”real” terms, ROE was 160 percent higher in 1970–2001 than 
during the classical gold standard, and about 90 percent higher than 
during the period of the Bretton Woods system.  
4 Return-on-equity  and  the debt-equity ratio  
Now for the main event. Figures 2 and 3 revealed that in the period 
1870–2001, ROE more than doubled, while the CAR decreased by 
more than half. This points to a positive long-term relationship be-
tween leverage and returns. The Leverage Formula states that there 
should be a positive linear relation between return-on-equity and the 
debt-equity ratio according to the expression  
DER b l l ROE ⋅ − + = ) ( ,            ( 2 )  
where l is return-on-assets, and (l – b) is the rate gap (or margin) be-
tween return-on-assets and return-on-debt b.3 Figure 4 shows ROE 
and the DER for the Swedish commercial banks, 1871–2001.  
                                                      
3 See for example Brealey and Myers (2000, p. 481).  
  10Figure 4 Return-on-equity and the debt-equity ratio of the Swedish commer-







































Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Average DER over the year. White 
dots mark WWI paper regime, 1915–1923. Year-marked dots are larger. Dots 
with negative returns in 1922, 1932, 1991–1993 not shown.  
A linear pattern can be discerned. For a period of sixty years 1870–
1930, points are clustered around profit levels of 6 percent and debt-
equity ratios between 3 and 5 (disregarding some high-ROE points in 
the first half of the 1870s and during the WWI paper regime). Follow-
ing the Kreuger crash in 1932, the DER jumps to a new level. In the 
early 1940s ROE begins to increase linearly with the DER. The trend 
continues when the Bretton Woods system is adopted in 1951. The 
trend continues also when the system is abandoned in 1971. Because 
of high leverage, the period 1972–2001 saw large fluctuations in ROE 
and the DER.  
Estimation  
The dependent variable is ROE. The independent variables are the 
debt-equity ratio (DER), monetary base growth (BASE), and dummy 
variables for financial crisis years (1922, 1932, 1991–1994). Monetary 
base growth is used as a measure of inflation. Intuitively, base expan-
sion should increase bank profits, since it increases banks' reserves 
and hence their lending capacity. An alternative measure of inflation 
is changes in the consumer price index. Regressions with this variable 
  11were also performed, but the variable tended to be statistically insig-
nificant. Because both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity can be 
detected, estimation (by maximum likelihood) is performed with two 
lags in the disturbance term, and where Huber-White standard errors 
are used. Two lags were chosen because one lag was not deemed suf-
ficent to grind out autocorrelation (as measured by the Durbin-
Watson d-statistic, DW). Moreover, because the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test for unit roots reveals that while ROE is stationary, the DER 
is not, I perform regressions on both differenced and undifferenced 
variables. The following two models are thus estimated:  
2












t u u u ε ρ ρ + + = − − 2 2 1 1 ,   i  =  {1,2}.          (3c) 
The constant is excluded in regression (3a), both for empirical and a 
priori reasons. If it is included, the coefficient would be statistically 
insignificant, but would distort the value of the DER-coefficient (but 
not its statistical significance). Since this coefficient has an economic 
interpretation (the magnitude of the rate gap), a priori reasons suggest 
exclusion of the constant. For the same reasons, a trend variable is not 
included in regression (3b): included it would be non-significant, but 
distort the value of the constant, which has an economic interpreta-
tion (the average return-on-assets).  
As mentioned in section 3.2, the years 1990–1994 were extranor-
mal times of drastic institutional change. Since the crisis of 1993 will 
heavily affect the difference between ROEs in 1993 and 1994, a 
dummy for the year 1994 is included. It turns out that the regression 
results are sensitive to the specification with regard to the dummies 
for 1991–1994. More exactly, whether a dummy for 1993 (CR93) is 
included or not. Although returns were strongly negative in this year 
(–25 percent), the difference in returns compared to those of 1992 is 
actually small. Although the coefficient for CR93 is statistically insig-
  12nificant, its inclusion or exclusion affects the statistical significance of 
the coefficient for dDER. Therefore, regressions with and without 
CR93 is reported. The adjusted R2 of the corresponding OLS regres-
sion (without disturbance lags) is also reported. Table 4 shows re-
gression results for regressions on differenced variables (dROE, dDER 
and dBASE).  
Table 4  Maximum likelihood estimation on differenced return-on-equity.   
Dependent variable dROE 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 



































































Obs.   130  130  62 41 22  109 
DW  2.01 2.01 2.03 1.98 2.02  1.98 
OLS R2  0.73 0.73 0.82 0.23 0.86  0.45 
Note: Huber-White standard errors. p-values in parentheses. Bold denotes 
statistical significance at the 5 percent level, and bold-italics at the 1 percent 
level. Dummies for the years 1922, 1932, 1991, 1992, 1993 (reported), and 
1994. (o.s.) = “out of sample”.  
Regressions (i–ii) illustrate how the result is affected by CR93. Includ-
ing the variable in the full-sample regression makes the coefficient of 
dDER statistically not significant at the 5 percent level: excluding it 
makes the coefficient significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests 
that a positive long-term relationship between leverage and profit-
ability can be found – but the relationship does not seem to be robust. 
However, regressions (iii–vi) reveal how the result depends on the 
years 1980–2001. Regression (iii) establishes that the dDER is not sig-
nificant when the sample is 1940–2001. However, it is significant 
when the years 1980–2001 are excluded, as regression (iv) shows. In-
  13deed, no relation between dROE and dDER can be found in 1980–2001 
(regression v). Regression (vi) drives home the point: when regress-
ing on the almost full sample 1872–1980, the dDER is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level.  
  In sum, a strong positive correlation between return-on-equity 
and the debt-equity ratio was found in 1872–1980. However, the cor-
relation was not present in 1980–2001. In this sense, this study sup-
ports the results of the previous studies by Berger, and Demirgüç-
Kunt & Huizinga. But these latter results could possibly reflect the 
conditions of the 1980s and 1990s. In Sweden, the 1980s was a period 
of rapid deregulation. Within a couple of years, the banking sector 
went from a state of complete regulation to a virtually unregulated. 
This was accompagnied by a large credit expansion, which was foll-
lowed in the early 1990s by the largest crisis in Swedish banking his-
tory. In the long term under more calm conditions, the “normal” 
positive relationship between leverage and profitability holds, and 
does so strongly.  
Estimating return-on-assets and the rate gap 
The Leverage Formula in (2) states how ROE depends on return-on-
assets l, and the rate gap (l – b). Performing the regression in (3a), the 
coefficients for the constant and DER can be interpreted as the average 
return-on-assets and the average rate-gap, over the period in ques-
tion. Table 5 show regression results on the sample 1871–2001.  
Table 5 Maximum likelihood estimation on return-on-equity (ROE).  















95% conf.   0.010–0.041 0.0049–0.0087       
Sample 1871–2001  dw  2.04    
Obs.   131  OLS R2 0.90     
Note: Huber/White standard errors. p-values in parentheses. Bold denotes 
statistical significance on the 5 percent level, and bold-italics on the 1 percent 
level. Dummies for the years 1922, 1932, 1991, 1992, 1993.  
  14Both the coefficients for the constant and DER is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient for the constant is 0.025 – 
indicating a return-on-assets of some 2.5 percent on average, over the 
period 1871–2001. This is not far off the mark. Calculating the average 
return-on-assets directly from the Summary Reports yields a value of 
1.6 percent for the period in question.  As seen in Table 5, this number 
falls within the 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimate. 
Likewise, the average rate gap was about 0.5–0.9 percent over the 
period.  
5 Conclusion   
Two recent studies surprisingly found a negative relationship be-
tween leverage and profitability in banking. This study presented 
new data on the Swedish commercial banks in 1870–2001, and ex-
plored the sign of the leverage-profitability relationship in the long 
term. The capital-asset ratio decreased from levels around 20 percent 
at the turn of the 19th century, to levels around 5 percent today. The 
drop occurred particularly during WWI and in 1940–1980. In the 
same period, return-on-equity more than doubled, from about 5 to 
about 13 percent in “real” terms. The Leverage Formula postulates a 
positive linear relationship between return-on-equity and the debt-
equity ratio. This was formally tested. A strong positive linear rela-
tion was found to exist over the period 1871–1980, but not in the 
1980s and 1990s. The results of previous studies are thus supported, 
while at the same time a long-term positive relationship between lev-
erage and profitability in banking is reaffirmed. Over the centuries, at 
least, the economic laws seem to be working.  
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